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INTRODUCTION
We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that problems of living
are put at the heart of the academic enterprise, and a basic aim becomes to help
humanity make progress towards as good a world as feasible.
From the past we have inherited a kind of academic inquiry that seeks to help
promote human welfare by, in the first instance, acquiring knowledge and
technological know-how. First, knowledge is to be acquired; then it can be applied to
help solve social problems. Inquiry of this type is still dominant in universities today.
But, judged from the all-important standpoint of promoting human welfare, this kind
of inquiry – which I shall call knowledge-inquiry – is grossly and damagingly
irrational. Three of the four most elementary rules of rational problem-solving are
violated in a wholesale, structural way. This long-standing, massive,
institutionalised irrationality in our universities, widely overlooked, is in part
responsible for the development of our current global problems, and our current
inability to tackle these problems intelligently, effectively and humanely.
Modern science and technological research have, of course, produced immense
benefits. They have made the modern world possible. But science and technological
know-how make possible modern industry and agriculture, modern hygiene and
medicine, which in turn lead to population growth, destruction of natural habitats and
rapid extinction of species, pollution of earth, sea and air, the lethal character of
modern war and terrorism, vast differences in wealth and power around the globe –
and, above all, global warming. In a perfectly respectable sense of ‘cause’, modern
science and technology are, indeed, the cause of these things.1
Some blame science for our problems, but this profoundly misses the point. Where
we have gone wrong is to pursue scientific and technological research dissociated
from a more fundamental concern with problems of living. We urgently need to bring
about a revolution in science, and in academic inquiry more generally, so that the
basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to
realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and
technological know-how, but much else besides. This revolution would affect every
branch and aspect of academia, and how it is related to the rest of the social world. 2
In what follows, I distinguish two kinds of inquiry, which I shall call knowledge-
inquiry and wisdom-inquiry. At the core of knowledge-inquiry there is a philosophy
of science which I shall call standard empiricism; the corresponding philosophy of
science at the core of wisdom-inquiry being aim-oriented empiricism. Standard
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what we still have, by and large, today. Aim-oriented empiricism and wisdom-
inquiry are what emerge when knowledge-inquiry is modified just sufficiently to
ensure elementary rules of rational problem-solving and aim-pursuing are
implemented, granted that the basic aim is to help promote human welfare, help
people realize what is of value in life.
There are two arguments. The first appeals to problem-solving rationality, the second
to aim-pursuing rationality. These establish that knowledge-inquiry is indeed
damagingly irrational – three of the four most elementary rules of rational problem-
solving are violated – wisdom-inquiry being what emerges when knowledge-inquiry
is modified just sufficiently to cure it of its grave rationality defects.
FIRST ARGUMENT: PROBLEM-SOLVING RATIONALITY
Knowledge-inquiry demands that a sharp split be made between the social or
humanitarian aims of inquiry and the intellectual aim. This latter is to acquire
knowledge of truth, nothing being presupposed about the truth. Only those
considerations may enter into the intellectual domain of inquiry relevant to the
determination of truth – claims to knowledge, results of observation and experiment,
arguments designed to establish truth or falsity. Feelings and desires, values, ideals,
political and religious views, expressions of hopes and fears, cries of pain,
articulation of problems of living: all these must be ruthlessly excluded from the
intellectual domain of inquiry as having no relevance to the pursuit of knowledge –
although of course inquiry can seek to develop factual knowledge about these things,
within psychology, sociology or anthropology. Within natural science, an even more
severe censorship system operates: an idea, in order to enter into the intellectual
domain of science, must be an empirically testable claim to factual knowledge.
For a much more detailed exposition of knowledge-inquiry see my (1984 or 2007, chapter 2).
For evidence that knowledge-inquiry prevails in academia, see my (1984 or 2007, chapter 6).
I do not claim that everything in academia accords with the edicts of knowledge-inquiry. My
claim is, rather, that this is the only candidate for rational inquiry in the public arena; it is the
dominant view, exercising an all-pervasive influence over academe. Work that does not
conform to its edicts has to struggle to survive. But this may be about to change, as we shall
briefly see below.
This is the conception of inquiry which, I claim, violates reason in a wholesale,
structural and damaging manner.
What do I mean by ‘reason’? As I use the term here, rationality appeals to the idea
that there are general methods, rules or strategies which, if put into practice, give us
our best chance, other things being equal, of solving our problems, realizing our aims.
Rationality is an aid to success, but does not guarantee success, and does not
3determine what needs to be done. (For further details see my 1984 or 2007, chapters
4 and 5).
Four elementary rules of reason, alluded to above, are:
(1) Articulate and seek to improve the articulation of the basic problem(s) to be
solved.
(2) Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions.
(3) When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved into a number of
specialized problems – preliminary, simpler, analogous, subordinate problems – (to
be tackled in accordance with rules (1) and (2)), in an attempt to work gradually
toward a solution to the basic problem to be solved.
(4) Inter-connect attempts to solve the basic problem and specialized problems, so
that basic problem-solving may guide, and be guided by, specialized problem-
solving.
Two preliminary points now need to be made.
First, granted that academic inquiry has, as its fundamental aim, to help promote
human welfare by intellectual and educational means,3 then the problems that inquiry
fundamentally ought to try to help solve are problems of living, problems of action.
From the standpoint of achieving what is of value in life, it is what we do, or refrain
from doing, that ultimately matters. Even where new knowledge and technological
know-how are relevant to the achievement of what is of value – as they are in
medicine or agriculture, for example – it is always what this new knowledge or
technological know-how enables us to do that matters. All the global problems
indicated above require, for their resolution, not merely new knowledge, but rather
new policies, new institutions, new ways of living. Scientific knowledge, and
associated technological know-how have, if anything, as we have seen, contributed to
the creation of these problems in the first place.
Second, in order to achieve what is of value in life more successfully than we do at
present, we need to discover how to resolve conflicts and problems of living in,
progressively, less violent, more cooperatively rational ways than we do at present.
Granted this, and granted that the above four rules of reason are put into practice
then, at the most fundamental level, academic inquiry needs to:
(1) Articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, personal, social and global
problems of living that need to be solved if the quality of human life is to be
enhanced (including those indicated above);
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actions, policies, political programmes, legislative proposals, ideologies,
philosophies of life.
In addition, of course, academic inquiry must:
(3) Break up the basic problems of living into subordinate, specialized problems – in
particular, specialized problems of knowledge and technology.
(4) Inter-connect basic and specialized problem-solving.
Academic inquiry as it mostly exists at present puts (3) into practice to splendid
effect. The intricate maze of specialized disciplines devoted to improving knowledge
and technological know-how that go to make up current academic inquiry is the
result. But, disastrously, what we have at present, academic inquiry devoted
primarily to improving knowledge, fails to put (1), (2) and (4) into practice. In
pursuing knowledge, academic inquiry may articulate problems of knowledge, and
propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible claims to knowledge –
factual theses, observational and experimental results, theories. But, as we have seen,
problems of knowledge are not (in general) problems of living; and solutions to
problems of knowledge are not (in general) solutions to problems of living. In so far
as academia does at present put (1) and (2) into practice, in departments of social
science and policy studies, it does so only at the periphery, and not as its central,
fundamental intellectual task.
In short, academic inquiry devoted primarily to the pursuit of knowledge, when
construed as having the basic humanitarian aim of helping to enhance the quality of
human life by intellectual means, fails to put the two most elementary rules of reason
into practice (rules (1) and (2)). Academic inquiry fails to do (at a fundamental level)
what it most needs to do, namely (1) articulate problems of living, and (2) propose
and critically assess possible solutions. And, as a result of failing to put (1) and (2)
into practice, knowledge-inquiry fails to put (4) into practice as well. As I have
remarked, three of the four most elementary rules of rational problem-solving are
violated. (For a much more detailed exposition of this argument see my 1984 or
2007.)
This gross structural irrationality of contemporary academic inquiry has profoundly
damaging consequences for humanity. In giving intellectual priority to problems of
knowledge, academia fails to do what it most needs to do: articulate our problems of
living, individual, social and global, and imaginatively develop and critically assess
possible solutions – possible actions, policies, political programmes, institutional
innovations, philosophies of life – designed, if adopted, to help us realize what is of
value in life, make progress towards a better world. Again, in devoting itself to
acquiring knowledge in a way that is unrelated to sustained concern about what
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practice, and thus failing to put (4) into practice as well, the danger is that scientific
and technological research will respond to the interests of the powerful and the
wealthy, rather than to the interests of the poor, of those most in need. Scientists,
officially seeking knowledge of truth per se, have no official grounds for objecting if
those who fund research – governments and industry – decide that the truth to be
sought will reflect their interests, rather than the interests of the world’s poor. And
priorities of scientific research, globally, do indeed reflect the interests of the first
world, rather than those of the third world. In this respect, funds devoted to military
research, in the USA, UK and some other wealthy countries, are especially disturbing: see
Langley (2005) and Smith (2003).
Knowledge and technology successfully pursued in a way that is not rationally
subordinated to the tackling of more fundamental problems of living, through the
failure to put (1), (2) and (4) into practice, is bound to lead to the kind of global
problems discussed above, problems that arise as a result of newly acquired powers to
act being divorced from the ability to act wisely. The creation of our current global
problems, and our inability to respond adequately to these problems, has much to do,
in other words, with the long-standing, rarely noticed, structural irrationality of our
institutions and traditions of learning. Knowledge-inquiry, because of its
irrationality, is designed to intensify, not help solve, our current global problems.
WISDOM-INQUIRY: PROBLEM-SOLVING VERSION
At once the question arises: What would a kind of inquiry be like that is devoted, in a
genuinely rational way, to promoting human welfare by intellectual means? The
answer is wisdom-inquiry.
As a first step at characterizing wisdom-inquiry, we may take knowledge-inquiry (at
its best) and modify it just sufficiently to ensure that all four elementary rules of
rational problem-solving, indicated above, are built into its intellectual and
institutional structure: see Figure 1.
The primary change that needs to be made is to ensure that academic inquiry
implements rules (1) and (2). It becomes the fundamental task of social inquiry and
the humanities (1) to articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, our problems
of living, and (2) to propose and critically assess possible solutions, from the
standpoint of their practicality and desirability. In particular, social inquiry has the
task of discovering how conflicts may be resolved in less violent, more cooperatively
rational ways. It also has the task of promoting such tackling of problems of living in
the social world beyond academe. Social inquiry is, thus, not primarily social
science, nor, primarily, concerned to acquire knowledge of the social world; its
primary task is to promote more cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living
6in the social world. Pursued in this way, social inquiry is intellectually more
fundamental than the natural and technological sciences, which tackle subordinate
Figure 1: Wisdom-Inquiry Implementing Problem-Solving Rationality
problems of knowledge, understanding and technology, in accordance with rule (3).
In Figure 1, implementation of rule (3) is represented by the specialized problem-
solving of the natural, technological and formal sciences, and more specialized
aspects of social inquiry and the humanities. Rule (4) is represented by the two-way
arrows linking fundamental and specialized problem-solving, each influencing the
other.
One can go further. According to this view, the thinking that we engage in as we
live, in seeking to realize what is of value to us, is intellectually more fundamental
than the whole of academic inquiry (the latter having, as its basic purpose, to help
cooperatively rational thinking and problem-solving in life to flourish). Academic
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result of implementing rule (3). This means there needs to be a two-way interplay of
ideas, arguments and experiences between the social world and academia, in
accordance with rule (4). This is represented, in figure 1, by the two-way arrows
linking academic inquiry and the social world.
The natural and technological sciences need to recognize three domains of
discussion: evidence, theory, and aims. Discussion of aims seeks to identify that
highly problematic region of overlap between that which is discoverable, and that
which it is of value to discover. Discussion of what it is of value to discover interacts
with social inquiry, in accordance with rule (4).
SECOND ARGUMENT: AIM-ORIENTED RATIONALITY
So much for my first argument in support of wisdom-inquiry. I come now to my
second argument, which appeals to, and modifies, the Enlightenment programme of
learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an
enlightened world.
In order to implement this programme properly, it is essential to get the following
three steps right.
1. The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified.
2. These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully
applicable to any human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just
applicable to the endeavour of improving knowledge.
3. The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited
correctly in the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an
enlightened, wise, civilized world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the 18th century Enlightenment got all three points
wrong. And as a result these blunders, undetected and uncorrected, are built into the
intellectual-institutional structure of academia as it exists today.
First, the philosophes failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of
natural science. From D’Alembert in the 18th century to Popper in the 20th (Popper,
1959, 1963), the widely held view, amongst both scientists and philosophers, has
been (and continues to be) that science proceeds by assessing theories impartially in
the light of evidence, no permanent assumption being accepted by science about the
universe independently of evidence. Preference may be given to simple, unified or
explanatory theories, but not in such a way that nature herself is, in effect, assumed to
be simple, unified or comprehensible. This orthodox view, which I call standard
empiricism is, however, untenable. If taken literally, it would instantly bring science
to a standstill. For, given any accepted theory of physics, T, Newtonian theory say,
8or quantum theory, endlessly many empirically more successful rivals can be
concocted which agree with T about observed phenomena but disagree arbitrarily
about some unobserved phenomena. Physics would be drowned in an ocean of such
empirically more successful rival theories.
In practice, these rivals are excluded because they are disastrously disunified. Two
considerations govern acceptance of theories in physics: empirical success and unity.
In demanding unity, we demand of a fundamental physical theory that it ascribes the
same dynamical laws to the phenomena to which the theory applies in addition to
empirical success. (For details of this account of theoretical unity see my 1998,
chapter. 4; 2004, appendix, section 2; 2007, chapter 14, section 2; or 2010, chapter 5.)
But in persistently accepting unified theories, to the extent of rejecting disunified
rivals that are just as, or even more, empirically successful, physics makes a big
persistent assumption about the universe. The universe is such that all disunified
theories are false. It has some kind of unified dynamic structure. It is physically
comprehensible in the sense that explanations for phenomena exist to be discovered.
(For a fuller exposition of this argument see my 1984, chapter 9, or 2007, chapters 9
and 14; and especially 1998, and 2004, chapters 1 and 2, and appendix.)
But this untestable (and thus metaphysical) assumption that the universe is physically
comprehensible is profoundly problematic. Science is obliged to assume, but does
not know, that the universe is comprehensible. Much less does it know that the
universe is comprehensible in this or that way. A glance at the history of physics
reveals that ideas have changed dramatically over time. In the 17th century there was
the idea that the universe consists of corpuscles, minute billiard balls, which interact
only by contact. This gave way to the idea that the universe consists of point-
particles surrounded by rigid, spherically symmetrical fields of force, which in turn
gave way to the idea that there is one unified self-interacting field, varying smoothly
throughout space and time. Nowadays we have the idea that everything is made up of
minute quantum strings embedded in ten or eleven dimensions of space-time. Some
kind of assumption along these lines must be made but, given the historical record,
and given that any such assumption concerns the ultimate nature of the universe, that
of which we are most ignorant, it is only reasonable to conclude that it is almost
bound to be false.
The way to overcome this fundamental dilemma inherent in the scientific enterprise is
to construe physics as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning
the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting
less and less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming more and more likely
to be true, and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit
of knowledge, to be possible at all: see figure 2. In this way a framework of
relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is
created within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and
9associated methods can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge
improves. Put another way, a framework of relatively unspecific, unproblematic,
fixed aims and methods is created within which much more specific and problematic
aims and methods evolve as scientific knowledge evolves. (A basic aim of science is
to discover in what precise way the universe is comprehensible, this aim evolving as
assumptions about comprehensibility evolve.) There is positive feedback between
improving knowledge, and improving aims-and-methods, improving knowledge-
about-how-to-improve-knowledge. This is the nub of scientific rationality, the
methodological key to the unprecedented success of science.4 Science adapts its
nature to what it discovers about the nature of the universe (see Maxwell, 1974; 1976;
1984 or 2007; 1998; 2004; 2010, chapter 5).
This hierarchical conception of physics, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, can
readily be generalized to take into account problematic assumptions associated with
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Figure 2: Hierarchical Conception of Science of Aim-Oriented Empiricism
the aims of science having to with values, and the social uses or applications of
science. It can be generalized so as to apply to the difference branches of natural
science. Different sciences have different specific aims, and so different specific
methods although, throughout natural science there is the common meta-methodology
of aim-oriented empiricism (Maxwell, 2004, pp. 41-7).
So much for the first blunder of the traditional Enlightenment, and how to put it right.
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Second, having failed to identify the methods of science correctly, the philosophes
naturally failed to generalize these methods properly. They failed to appreciate that
the idea of representing the problematic aims (and associated methods) of science in
the form of a hierarchy can be generalized and applied fruitfully to other worthwhile
enterprises besides science. Many other enterprises have problematic aims –
problematic because aims conflict, and because what we seek may be unrealizable,
undesirable, or both. Such enterprises, with problematic aims, would benefit from
employing a hierarchical methodology, generalized from that of science, thus making
it possible to improve aims and methods as the enterprise proceeds. There is the hope
that, as a result of exploiting in life methods generalized from those employed with
such success in science, some of the astonishing success of science might be exported
into other worthwhile human endeavours, with problematic aims quite different from
those of science.
Third, and most disastrously of all, the philosophes failed completely to try to apply
such generalized, hierarchical progress-achieving methods to the immense, and
profoundly problematic enterprise of making social progress towards an enlightened,
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wise world. The aim of such an enterprise is notoriously problematic. For all sorts of
reasons, what constitutes a good world, an enlightened, wise or civilized world,
attainable and genuinely desirable, must be inherently and permanently problematic.5
Here, above all, it is essential to employ the generalized version of the hierarchical,
progress-achieving methods of science, designed specifically to facilitate progress
when basic aims are problematic: see Figure 3. It is just this that the philosophes
failed to do. Instead of applying the hierarchical methodology to social life, the
philosophes sought to apply a seriously defective conception of scientific method to
social science, to the task of making progress towards, not a better world, but to
better knowledge of social phenomena. And this ancient blunder, developed
throughout the 19th century by J.S. Mill, Karl Marx and many others, and built into
academia in the early 20th century with the creation of the diverse branches of the
Figure 3: Hierarchical Social Methodology Generalized from Science
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social sciences in universities all over the world, is still built into the institutional and
intellectual structure of academia today, inherent in the current character of social
science (Maxwell, 1984 or 2007, chapters 3, 6 and 7).
WISDOM-INQUIRY: AIM-PURSUING VERSION
Properly implemented, in short, the Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific
progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world would involve
developing social inquiry, not primarily as social science, but rather as social
methodology, or social philosophy. A basic task would be to get into personal and
social life, and into other institutions besides that of science – into government,
industry, agriculture, commerce, the media, law, education, international relations –
hierarchical, progress-achieving methods (designed to improve problematic aims)
arrived at by generalizing the methods of science. A basic task for academic inquiry
as a whole would be to help humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems
of living in more just, cooperatively rational ways than at present. This task would be
intellectually more fundamental than the scientific task of acquiring knowledge.
Social inquiry would be intellectually more fundamental than physics. Academia
would be a kind of people’s civil service, doing openly for the public what actual
civil services are supposed to do in secret for governments. Academia would have
just sufficient power (but no more) to retain its independence from government,
industry, the press, public opinion, and other centres of power and influence in the
social world. It would seek to learn from, educate, and argue with the great social
world beyond, but would not dictate. Academic thought would be pursued as a
specialized, subordinate part of what is really important and fundamental: the
thinking that goes on, individually, socially and institutionally, in the social world,
guiding individual, social and institutional actions and life. The fundamental
intellectual and humanitarian aim of inquiry would be to help humanity acquire
wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize (apprehend and create) what is of
value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge and
technological know-how but much else besides.
One outcome of getting into social and institutional life the kind of aim-evolving,
hierarchical methodology indicated above, generalized from science, is that it
becomes possible for us to develop and assess rival philosophies of life as a part of
social life, somewhat as theories are developed and assessed within science. Such a
hierarchical methodology provides a framework within which competing views about
what our aims and methods in life should be – competing religious, political and moral
views – may be cooperatively assessed and tested against broadly agreed, unspecific
aims (high up in the hierarchy of aims) and the experience of personal and social life.
There is the possibility of cooperatively and progressively improving such philosophies
of life (views about what is of value in life and how it is to be achieved) much as theories are
cooperatively and progressively improved in science. In science, ideally, theories are
critically assessed with respect to each other, with respect to metaphysical ideas
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concerning the comprehensibility of the universe, and with respect to experience
(observational and experimental results). In a somewhat analogous way, diverse
philosophies of life may be critically assessed with respect to each other, with respect to
relatively uncontroversial, agreed ideas about aims and what is of value, and with
respect to experience – what we do, achieve, fail to achieve, enjoy and suffer – the aim
being to improve philosophies of life (and more specific philosophies of more specific
enterprises within life such as government, education or art) so that they offer greater help
with the realization of what is of value in life. This hierarchical methodology is
especially relevant to the task of resolving conflicts about aims and ideals, as it helps
disentangle agreement (high up in the hierarchy) and disagreement (more likely to be
low down in the hierarchy).
Wisdom-inquiry, because of its greater rigour, has intellectual standards that are, in
important respects, different from those of knowledge-inquiry. Whereas knowledge-
inquiry demands that emotions and desires, values, human ideals and aspirations,
philosophies of life be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry, wisdom-
inquiry requires that they be included. In order to discover what is of value in life it
is essential that we attend to our feelings and desires. But not everything we desire is
desirable, and not everything that feels good is good. Feelings, desires and values
need to be subjected to critical scrutiny. And of course feelings, desires and values
must not be permitted to influence judgements of factual truth and falsity.
Wisdom-inquiry embodies a synthesis of traditional Rationalism and Romanticism.
It includes elements from both, and it improves on both. It incorporates Romantic
ideals of integrity, having to do with motivational and emotional honesty, honesty
about desires and aims; and at the same time it incorporates traditional Rationalist
ideals of integrity, having to do with respect for objective fact, knowledge, and valid
argument. Traditional Rationalism takes its inspiration from science and method;
Romanticism takes its inspiration from art, from imagination, and from passion.
Wisdom-inquiry holds art to have a fundamental rational role in inquiry, in revealing
what is of value, and unmasking false values; but science, too, is of fundamental
importance. What we need, for wisdom, is an interplay of sceptical rationality and
emotion, an interplay of mind and heart, so that we may develop ‘mindful hearts and
heartfelt minds’ (Maxwell, 1976, p. 5). It is time we healed the great rift in our
culture, so graphically depicted by Snow (1964).
All in all, if the Enlightenment revolution had been carried through properly, the
three steps indicated above being correctly implemented, the outcome would have
been a kind of academic inquiry very different from what we have at present, inquiry
devoted primarily to the intellectual aim of acquiring knowledge.
FIRST HINTS OF THE REVOLUTION
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During the last 10-20 years, numerous changes have occurred in academia that
amount to a shift towards wisdom-inquiry. In what follows I concentrate on
universities in the UK.
Perhaps the most significant of these steps is the creation of departments, institutions
and research centres concerned with social policy, development, environmental
degradation, climate change, poverty, injustice and war, and other matters such as
medical ethics and community health: see Iredale (2007) and Macdonald (2009) for
developments of this point.
At Cambridge University, one can see the first hints of the institutional structure of
wisdom-inquiry being superimposed upon the existing structure of knowledge-
inquiry. As I have emphasized, wisdom-inquiry puts the intellectual tackling of
problems of living at the heart of academic inquiry, this activity being conducted in
such a way that it both influences, and is influenced by, more specialized research.
Knowledge-inquiry, by contrast, organizes intellectual activity into the conventional
departments of knowledge: physics, chemistry, biology, history and the rest, in turn
subdivided, again and again, into increasingly specialized research disciplines. But
this knowledge-inquiry structure of ever more specialized research is hopelessly
inappropriate when it comes to tackling problems of living. In order to tackle
environmental problems, for example, in a rational and effective way, specialized
research into a multitude of different fields, from geology, engineering and
economics to climate science, biology, architecture and metallurgy, needs to be
connected to, and coordinated with, the different aspects of environmental problems.
(For the fundamental importance of interconnecting work on broad and specialized
problems, see my 1980.) The sheer urgency of environmental problems has, it seems,
forced Cambridge University to create the beginnings of wisdom-inquiry
organization to deal with the issue. The ‘Cambridge Environmental Initiative’ (CEI),
launched in December 2004, distinguishes eight fields associated with environmental
problems: conservation; climate change; energy; society, policy and law; water;
waste; built environment; natural hazards; and under these headings, coordinates
some 102 research groups working on specialized aspects of environmental issues in
some 25 different (knowledge-inquiry) departments: see www.cei.group.cam.ac.uk/,
accessed 30 May 2010. The CEI holds seminars, workshops and public lectures to
put specialized research workers in diverse fields in touch with one another, and to
inform the public.
A similar coordinating, interdisciplinary initiative exists at Oxford University. This is
the School of Geography and the Environment, founded in 2005 under another name.
It is made up of five research ‘clusters’, two previously established research centres,
the Environmental Change Institute (founded in 1991) and the Transport Studies
Institute, and three inter-departmental research programmes, the African
Environments Programme the Oxford Centre for Water Research, and the Oxford
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branch of the Tyndall Centre. The School has links with other such research centres,
for example the UK Climate Impact Programme and the UK Energy Research Centre.
At Oxford University there is also the James Martin 21st Century School, founded in
2005 to ‘formulate new concepts, policies and technologies that will make the future
a better place to be’. It is made up of fifteen Institutes devoted to research that ranges
from ageing, armed conflict, cancer therapy and carbon reduction to nanoscience,
oceans, science innovation and society, the future of the mind, and the future of
humanity. At Oxford there is also the Smith School of Enterprise and the
Environment, founded in 2008 to help government and industry tackle the challenges
of the 21st century, especially those associated with climate change.
Similar developments have taken place recently at my own university, University
College London. Not only are there over 141 research institutes and centres at UCL,
some only recently founded, many interdisciplinary in character, devoted to such
themes as ageing, cancer, cities, culture, public policy, the environment, global
health, governance, migration, and security. In addition, very recently, partly
influenced by my own work, the attempt has been made to organize research at UCL
around a few broad themes that include: global health, sustainable cities, intercultural
interactions, and human wellbeing. This is being done so that UCL may all the better
contribute to solving the immense global problems that confront humanity.
On the UCL website, the rationale for the global challenges initiative is spelled out in
a way which echoes the case for wisdom-inquiry:
The world is in crisis. Billions of us suffer from illness and disease, despite
applicable preventions and cures. Life in our cities is under threat from
dysfunctionality and climate change. The prospect of global peace and
cooperation remains under assault from tensions between our nations, faiths
and cultures. Our quality of life – actual and perceived – diminishes despite
technological advances. These are global problems, and we must resolve
them if future generations are to be provided with the opportunity to flourish
(www.ucl.ac.uk/grand-challenges/, accessed 29 May 2010).
These developments, echoed in many other UK universities, can be
regarded as first steps towards implementing wisdom-inquiry. For further indications
that the revolution may be underway see my (2009).
CONCLUSION
Research in universities has been devoted, primarily, to acquiring knowledge and
technological know-how. But knowledge and technological know-how increase our
power to act which, without wisdom, can lead to as much harm as benefit. Current
global crises, and especially the most serious, global warming, have arisen in this
way. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in our universities so that they
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come to seek and promote wisdom – wisdom being understood to be the capacity to
realize what is of value in life, thus including knowledge, understanding and
technological know-how, but much else besides. Universities need to take up the task
of helping humanity learn how to make progress towards as good a world as possible.
This revolution – intellectual, institutional and cultural – if it ever comes about, will
be comparable in its long-term impact to that of the Renaissance, the scientific
revolution, or the Enlightenment. There are signs that this urgently needed
revolution may already be underway. If so, it is happening with agonizing slowness,
in a dreadfully muddled and piecemeal way. The underlying intellectual reasons for
academic change need to be much more widely appreciated, to help give direction,
coherence and a rationale to the nascent academic revolution, and to help ensure that
the intellectual value and integrity of science and scholarship are strengthened and
not subverted.
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NOTES
1 It may be objected that it is not science that is the cause of our global problems but
rather the things that we do, made possible by science and technology. This is
obviously correct. But it is also correct to say that scientific and technological
progress is the cause. The meaning of ‘cause’ is ambiguous. By ‘the cause’ of event
E we may mean something like ‘the most obvious observable events preceding E that
figure in the common sense explanation for the occurrence of E’. In this sense,
human actions (made possible by science) are the cause of such things as people
being killed in war, destruction of tropical rain forests. On the other hand, by the
‘cause’ of E we may mean ‘that prior change in the environment of E which led to the
occurrence of E, and without which E would not have occurred’. If we put our times
into the context of human history, then it is entirely correct to say that, in this sense,
scientific-and-technological progress is the cause of our distinctive current global
disasters: what has changed, what is new, is scientific knowledge, not human nature.
(Give a group of chimpanzees rifles and teach them how to use them and in one
sense, of course, the cause of the subsequent demise of the group would be the
actions of the chimpanzees. But in another obvious sense, the cause would be the
sudden availability and use of rifles – the new, lethal technology.) Yet again, from
the standpoint of theoretical physics, ‘the cause’ of E might be interpreted to mean
something like ‘the physical state of affairs prior to E, throughout a sufficiently large
spatial region surrounding the place where E occurs’. In this third sense, the sun
continuing to shine is as much a part of the cause of war and pollution as human
action or human science and technology.
2 For a much more detailed account of this revolution, why it is needed and what its
implications are, see my (1984 or, better, 2007). See also my (1976; 1980; 1998;
2004 and 2010). For an overview of my work plus critical discussion of it by eleven
scholars see McHenry (2009). See also www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk.
3 This assumption may be challenged. Does not academic inquiry seek knowledge for its
own sake – it may be asked – whether it helps promote human welfare or not? Elsewhere
(Maxwell, 2007, pp. 17-19, 70-5, 205-13) I argue that wisdom-inquiry does better justice
than knowledge-inquiry to both aspects of inquiry, pure and applied. The basic aim of
inquiry, according to wisdom-inquiry, is to help us realize what is of value in life, ‘realize’
meaning both ‘apprehend’ and ‘make real’. ‘Realize’ thus accommodates both aspects of
inquiry, ‘pure’ research or ‘knowledge pursued for its own sake’ on the one hand, and
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technological or ‘mission-oriented’ research on the other – both, ideally, seeking to
contribute to what is of value in human life. Wisdom-inquiry, like sight, is there to help us
find our way around. And like sight, wisdom-inquiry is of value to us in two ways: for its
intrinsic value, and for practical purposes. The first is almost more precious than the second.
4 Natural science has made such astonishing progress in improving knowledge and
understanding of nature because it has put something like the hierarchical methodology of
aim-oriented empiricism, indicated here, into scientific practice. Officially, however,
scientists continue to hold the standard empiricist view that no untestable metaphysical theses
concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe are accepted as a part of
scientific knowledge: see Maxwell (2004, pp. 5-6, especially note 5, and 13-14, note 14). As
I have argued elsewhere (Maxwell, 1998, pp. 23-33; 2004, chapter 2), science would be even
more successful, in a number of ways, if scientists adopted and explicitly implemented the
hierarchical methodology indicated here.
5 There are a number of ways of highlighting the inherently problematic character of
the aim of creating civilization. People have very different ideas as to what does
constitute civilization. Most views about what constitutes Utopia, an ideally civilized
society, have been unrealizable and profoundly undesirable. People's interests,
values and ideals clash. Even values that, one may hold, ought to be a part of
civilization may clash. Thus freedom and equality, even though inter-related, may
nevertheless clash. It would be an odd notion of individual freedom which held that
freedom was for some, and not for others; and yet if equality is pursued too single-
mindedly this will undermine individual freedom, and will even undermine equality,
in that a privileged class will be required to enforce equality on the rest, as in the old
Soviet Union. A basic aim of legislation for civilization, we may well hold, ought to
be increase freedom by restricting it: this brings out the inherently problematic,
paradoxical character of the aim of achieving civilization.
